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KELLY’S LEGACY IN PERSONALITY THEORY:  
REASONS TO BE CHEERFUL 
 
Trevor W. Butt 
 
Division of Psychology, University of Huddersfield, Huddersfield, UK 
 
 
Personal Construct Theory (PCT) appears to be frozen in history. Kelly’s work is usually mentioned respect-
fully in any review of personality theories, yet virtually all contemporary work on PCT is ignored in orthodox 
psychology. In this article I examine this paradox and suggest reasons for it. I review the way in which PCT is 
treated in introductory texts, pointing to two types of account. In one, PCT is seen as a pre-scientific proto-
type of a cognitive approach to personality. In the other, it is seen as working at the phenomenological level 
of analysis (a level seen as of limited importance). I conclude by thinking about possible futures for PCT, and 
arguing for its importance as an approach for understanding (not explaining) human action.  
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In this article, I want to think about the position 
of Personal Construct Theory in contemporary 
psychology. And we are immediately presented 
with a paradox. Kelly appears to be both well 
enough known and respected. Yet PCT is pushed 
to the margins of personality theory. Even grid 
technique, often seen as having a life of its own 
is past its peak. Bell (2003) tells us that 10,000 
grids per year have been analysed as early as 
1973, and the 1980s were its ‘high tide’. Walker 
and Winter (2007) tell us that Kelly is mentioned 
in nearly 50% of the volumes of the prestigious 
Annual Review of Psychology between 1955 and 
2005. PCT is covered, albeit briefly, in every 
personality text that I have seen. And yet PCT is 
marginal in contemporary personality theory. 
Those with a serious interest in PCT are a 
shrinking group, tolerated but not listened to. As 
I collected my senior citizens’ bus pass recently, 
I thought that it was rather similar. Provided you 
don’t make a fuss, people will let you get on 
with your business. But you’re increasingly in-
visible in a youth-driven world. Personal con-
struct theory belongs to the past. Why? 
In order to make some sense of this, I want to 
start by considering the official history of per-
sonality theories. So, what sort of account do we 
get of PCT in introductory textbooks? And how 
is PCT seen to fit into the narrative? We will see 
that the official history paints a distorted and 
emasculated picture of the theory. I will argue 
that it is frozen in the past because of the natural 
sciences framework in which contemporary per-
sonality theory is set. One reason for hope is that 
there are developments outside this orthodoxy 
that should welcome the pragmatic approach of 
PCT. 
 
 
THE TEXTBOOK STORY 
 
Perhaps the best way to glimpse the official posi-
tion of PCT is to look at how it is portrayed in 
undergraduate textbooks. Just how is the range 
of personality theories presented to undergradu-
ate students and where does PCT fit? What sort 
of story is told in introductory texts? Generally 
there are two:  
Story 1. Different theories are treated as 
though they belonged to a pre-paradigmatic pe-
riod in the development of psychological science 
(for example, Pervin & John, 2001). Scientific 
endeavour begins with the competition between 
different constructions of the world. A discipline 
can be called a science when some consensus 
emerges about its world-view. When paradigms 
are described, it is in terms of the development 
of physics. Newtonian physics gave way to Ein-
stein’s revolution as evidence emerged that a 
deeper truth had been unearthed by the theory of 
relativity. Psychology is a young science and is 
perhaps emerging with its first proper paradigm 
(like Newton’s theory): a cognitive paradigm. In 
this story, PCT is described as one of those early 
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constructions coming from the clinical field. Its 
contribution was to advocate a cognitive ap-
proach during the arid years of behaviourist he-
gemony. It is respected then as a precursor of 
cognitivism.  
Story 2. Different personality theories are 
portrayed as occupying different levels of analy-
sis – trait, psychodynamic, phenomenological, 
behavioural, cognitive and biological (for exam-
ple, Mischel, Schoda & Smith, 2004). Again, 
physics is sometimes referred to. Rather like 
complementarity in physics, different theories 
are seen as co-existing, much as quantum theory 
exists side by side with the theory of relativity. 
Each has its own realm: quantum physics in sub-
atomic particles and relativity at an astronomical 
level. Existing in a complementary way, differ-
ent personality approaches support each other in 
providing a full description and explanation of 
behaviour. PCT fits into this narrative like this: it 
belongs to an era of grand theories that has now 
past. It works at the phenomenological level, 
telling us how people see themselves and what 
they are up to. This might be interesting, but of 
course this doesn’t explain their behaviour. Un-
derlying motives, or biological factors or cogni-
tive structure might do this.  
Story 2 sees psychological science as slightly 
more mature than does Story 1. It allows for the 
co-existence of alternative constructions. Even 
so, some have more power than others. The phe-
nomenological level is about description only – 
understanding and not explanation. Mischel, 
Schoda and Smith (2004) write of “encouraging 
signs of integration”, but this is what they see as 
at the explanatory level. Cognitive psychology 
can assimilate unconscious activity and anchors 
itself in brain science. Different parts of the brain 
and brain stem are activated in different types of 
shyness, we are told. This points to a link be-
tween cognitive-behavioural phenomena and 
brain activity. ‘We now know’ that there are dif-
ferent types of shyness, based on different types 
of brain activity. 
 
 
WELL I NEVER! 
 
I remember reading that there are three types of 
orthodox psychology research: Look how careful 
I’ve been, I told you so! and Well, I never. Most 
of the impressive integration in the personality 
field is in the last category. This shyness finding 
was old hat even when H. J. Eysenck presented it 
50 years ago. Of course, if the shy person wants 
help (and they might well not define themselves 
as shy), you don’t have to know anything at all 
about brains to help them. And what is more, 
you don’t have to look up much in the cognitive-
behavioural literature either. 
In both stories, it is sometimes said that PCT 
hasn’t progressed in the USA because:  
a) Kelly was quite a shy man who didn’t push 
his theory much 
b) PCT came out of nowhere, it wasn’t linked 
to other developments in psychology. He de-
nied it was a cognitive theory.  
c) But for some reason, it’s popular in England! 
Both (a) and (b) are quite wrong of course. 
Cromwell (2007) has commented on the great 
boost Kelly got from the 1955 publication. He 
gave several addresses to a wide range of groups 
(collected together by Maher in 1969.) And his 
theory was firmly based in the pragmatic tradi-
tion – I’ll return to this point later.  
 
 
DOES THE EVIDENCE FIT THE STORY? 
 
But what about the coherence of this narrative of 
psychology’s development as a science? Does 
the evidence fit this theory? The argument is that 
there is an increasing consensus that a dominant 
cognitive paradigm is emerging. And cognition 
is increasingly linked to biological factors. We 
can see this, we are told, in the publications in 
top journals. Pervin and John (2001) cite a study 
by Robbins here. But the ‘top journals’ are North 
American. What about those in France, China 
and Russia? How many European articles from 
Spain, Italy, Scandinavia and Germany make it 
into these journals? Could it be that this is an 
Anglophonic prejudice? And could it be that 
contributors know that they had better speak a 
cognitive language before attempting a submis-
sion? Might the change in nomenclature of the 
North American Personal Construct Network to 
the Constructivist Psychology Network be inter-
preted as an acknowledgement of this condition? 
Much of what passes a constructivist here has a 
cognitive slant after all.  
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And how convincing is this story that cogni-
tivism is a paradigm that it has triumphed over 
other paradigms, say, behaviourism, humanism 
and psychoanalysis and lexical trait theory, 
through the gathering of evidence? Let us look at 
its clash with ‘trait and state theories’ 40 years 
ago. This is when Walter Mischel (1968) pub-
lished Personality and Assessment. As a clinical 
psychology student in the 1970s, I was much 
taken with this book, and will deal here with his 
demolition of trait theories.  
 
 
The case of non-disappearing trait theory 
 
Mischel’s argument is often over-simplified and 
represented as advocating the situation-
specificity of behaviour. In fact his argument 
was a pragmatic one: it is better not to assume 
the generality of behaviour on the basis of a trait 
assessment. There is of course some coherence 
to any individual’s conduct, but this is not cap-
tured by trait theory. People act similarly in 
situations that they see as similar, and their be-
haviour is the result of their expectations of simi-
lar outcome of their behaviour. A person may be 
domineering with their child but not with the 
police officer who pulls them up for speeding. A 
trait like ‘domineering’ is not an underlying pre-
disposition that explains behaviour. Mischel’s 
argument may be summed up in this way: 
 
1. As Skinner had claimed, traits give us a de-
scription of behaviour, masquerading as an 
explanation. To say somebody is dependent 
describes their behaviour but does not ex-
plain it. Explanations must be sought in their 
interaction with the environment. This is 
complex and accounts for the variation in 
their behaviour. Psychologists are bamboo-
zled by factor analysis into believing that 
there is more generality in behaviour than is 
in fact the case. So higher order factors are 
often built on significant correlations of 0.3. 
But this only indicates 9% of the variance in 
common. A correlation may be statistically 
significant in that it is not entirely due to 
chance. This does not mean that it is psycho-
logically meaningful. After all, when 81% of 
the variance is due to situational variables, 
there is little evidence of the power of traits 
to explain behaviour. Any consistency in 
personality cannot be explained by trait 
structure. 
 
2. Mischel (1968, p. 44) further points out that 
the claim of a consistent and stable personal-
ity structure rests on the assumption that this 
reflects the organisation of attributes in those 
being assessed. He goes on to argue that this 
assumption is in fact not justified. He cites 
extensive evidence that, instead, it reflects 
the perceptual prejudices of the assessors, 
who draw on a culturally shared trait theory 
to frame their observations. So traits are not 
a property of people being rated, but of those 
doing the rating. Like beauty, traits are in the 
eye of the beholder. The traits that we think 
we find in others represent our personal con-
struction of them. One study he cited found 
that raters produced the same stable trait 
structure in people that they observed very 
briefly and did not know as in those that they 
knew well. This can only be the result of 
‘reading in’ attributes on the flimsiest of 
evidence. People readily commit the Funda-
mental Attribution Error of attributing dispo-
sitions or traits to others when this is not jus-
tified (Langdridge and Butt, 2004). Yet the 
personality questionnaires that form the ba-
sis of Eysenck’s and others’ trait theories are 
constructed from factor analytical studies 
that are based on this error. What seems at 
first glance like a strength in trait theories is 
transformed into a flaw.  
 
3. In fact there is nothing objective about ‘ob-
jective tests’, except that they are scored 
with a stencil. Mischel argues that what we 
get from a person’s personality questionnaire 
is not an objective account of their behav-
iour, but an impression – in effect, a theory 
about themselves. You might be asked if you 
often have headaches, like going to parties or 
worry about the future. You are asked to 
work quickly, giving impressions rather than 
consulting behavioural referents for your 
choices. Now ‘often’ might mean 20% of the 
time to me and 50% of the time to you, but 
what gets recorded is respondents’ impres-
sions of themselves. I might tick ‘Yes’ to the 
same question that you tick ‘No’ to, even 
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though you might have more headaches than 
me. Each question is loaded in one of the 
factors on which the instrument is con-
structed, and contributes to their score on it. 
These factors, as we have seen, are in turn 
contaminated by the Fundamental Attribu-
tion Error. Now this does not mean that this 
output is meaningless. But it indicates that it 
tells us something about the way we per-
ceive and construe things, and not about the 
existence of a trait structure that is responsi-
ble for conduct.  
 
If we are interested in a person’s theory about 
him- or herself, Mischel suggests that we use a 
procedure that is specifically designed to do just 
this. Mischel himself was a student of George 
Kelly, and in this context frequently recom-
mends both Kelly’s clinical wisdom and his phe-
nomenological methods. 
Now, if the science of personality was fol-
lowing Kuhnian lines of paradigm development, 
one would expect this convincing argument to 
have carried the day. Trait theory should be side-
lined. And although it has been relied on less in 
clinical contexts, it has continued to be used in 
occupational psychology. Here it lived on, while 
its proponents argued about whether it was best 
to describe an individual in terms of 3, 5 or 16 
factors. The advent of the ‘Big Five’ is some-
times portrayed as an advance, an emerging con-
sensus in the scientific community, but of course 
it never convinced either Eysenck or Cattell. 
Mischel’s attack on what he calls the ‘state theo-
ries’ of psychoanalysis and humanism is alto-
gether less convincing. And of course it has not 
led to their demise. They simply lead parallel 
lives outside orthodox psychology. To under-
stand this, we have to remember where personal-
ity theories came from. They arose in parallel in 
three different traditions in psychology: the psy-
chometric tradition produced trait measurements, 
the experimental tradition gave rise to behav-
iourism and later social cognitive learning the-
ory, and the clinical tradition produced the theo-
ries of Freud, Rogers and Kelly. Theories had 
different jobs to do, depending on their focus of 
convenience.  
So cognitivism has not emerged as a domi-
nant paradigm within personality theory at all. 
This is simply a claim from those working 
within the orthodox experimental tradition. And 
even within this tradition the contention is un-
convincing. We read that ‘we now know’ that 
cognitions do indeed cause behaviour, as though 
this has become clear from empirical work. Was 
it not the case that behaviourism simply went out 
of fashion? With the advent of the microchip and 
personal computer in the 1970s, computer mod-
els of the mind became acceptable. Cognitive 
psychology led to cognitive-behaviour therapy, 
and unorthodox psychoanalysts like Beck and 
Ellis suddenly discovered that they had been 
talking cognitive behavioural prose all their 
lives, so to speak. Here it is useful to remember 
Kelly’s comment that clinical psychology is 
pure, not applied psychology. Psychotherapists 
do not scour the journals for laboratory findings 
that they can apply in their work. The clinical 
tradition produces theories of people that work in 
that context. Neither Beck (1976) nor Ellis 
(1962) relies on cognitive theory for their prac-
tice. The traffic is entirely in the other direction. 
Cognitive psychologists call on their practice to 
legitimise their theories.  
In fact none of the social sciences fit Kuhn’s 
theory of paradigm shifts. There are always dif-
ferent constructions of events that vie with each 
other. Which become dominant depends on so-
cietal forces (e.g. market forces), not on philoso-
phical argument or experimental proofs. Trait 
theory didn’t go away. It carried on in personnel 
work where people believed in it. Psychoanalysis 
wasn’t replaced by rational theories – it carried 
on a parallel life because it is so deeply ingrained 
in our culture and people are prepared to pay for 
it. 
 
 
In summary 
 
Kelly is represented positively in the history of 
personality psychology because PCT fits nicely 
into the narrative of the development of a mature 
science. He is a fore-runner of cognitivism, a 
courageous early out-rider for the new paradigm. 
But PCT is frozen in history, squeezed into a 
Procrustean bed in a way he would doubtless 
construe as hostile. He didn’t see constructs as 
cognitions that caused behaviour at all. If we 
accept the apparent respect with which PCT is 
treated, we consign ourselves to the past. Let’s 
Kelly’s legacy in personality theory 
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not fool ourselves that PCT is alive and kicking 
in contemporary personality theory; it’s dead and 
mummified.  
But there are reasons to be hopeful (if not 
cheerful!). Psychology does not fit well into the 
natural sciences, and like philosophy, sociology 
and political science, has had to settle for a num-
ber of traditions that exist in parallel. As we have 
seen, these are judged in terms of their useful-
ness and how they serve different interests. In-
creasingly, our discipline is fragmenting. No 
longer is there a simplistic insistence on predic-
tion and control as the only criterion of scientific 
endeavour. It is recognised that foresight and 
understanding do not necessarily go hand in 
hand. Understanding itself is seen as a goal. This 
is where PCT’s contribution can be most valu-
able.  
 
 
PRAGMATISM 
 
Earlier on, I said it is wrongly claimed that PCT 
stands as an isolated theory, and that Kelly in-
vented it out of nothing. Consequently, it is a 
one-man show, and since he died, it inevitably 
went into a decline, having no firm grounding 
anywhere else in psychology. Kelly of course, is 
partly responsible for this misconception. Al-
though he famously said that Dewey’s pragma-
tism was everywhere between the lines of the 
theory, he did not reference his sources, prefer-
ring to argue everywhere from first principles. 
But he knew that knowledge is always a joint 
construction. Citing Dewey as an example of a 
leader of a movement, he says: 
 
The leader simply adds a large increment 
to an already massive structure in order to 
complete an invention, whether it be so-
cial or physical. The main structure is 
supplied by the average and mediocre 
people, each of whom brings his little con-
tribution and throws it onto the pile. 
(Kelly, 1979: 16). 
 
And Pragmatism is being noticed again. The 
work of James and Dewey is once again referred 
to in social psychology, Mead always had his 
followers in symbolic interactionism, and Rich-
ard Rorty’s aggressive defences of neo-
pragmatism are widely known, both in and out-
side psychology. PCT is very firmly grounded in 
Pragmatism. This was a philosophical movement 
that took root in the USA in the wake of the 
Civil War. In the early 1870s Charles Peirce, 
William James, Oliver Wendell-Holmes and 
others formed the Metaphysical Club in Cam-
bridge MS. Menand (2002) distilled the essence 
of pragmatism to the proposition that ideas are 
not ‘out there’, waiting to be discovered, but are 
constructions that are more or less useful in help-
ing us in one venture or another. The pragmatists 
introduced a healthy scepticism into the academy 
– no theory was to be taken as truth, no idea ac-
cepted uncritically. Theories arise in practice, 
and are like tools to be put aside when they no 
longer give us a grip on the world. Dewey’s ver-
sion in particular was strongly against the dual-
isms that have dogged psychology, dualisms like 
person versus world and mind versus body. All 
this should certainly sound familiar to those with 
a deeper appreciation of Kelly’s contribution. 
Pragmatism was the dominant form of psy-
chology up until the first decade of the twentieth 
century in the USA. William James had been the 
first psychology professor at Harvard, and his 
student Thorndike had conducted the famous 
animal experiments using cats in puzzle boxes. 
Dewey and Mead were at Chicago University in 
the philosophy department, but engaged in work 
on educational and social psychology. Mead was 
still there when his student John Watson split 
from the department with a group of others to 
form the first department of experimental psy-
chology. Mead’s work would become defined as 
the contrast pole to psychology – philosophy, 
and be rescued for the social sciences by interac-
tionist sociology. Experimental psychology 
shaped itself on physics. No Cartesian dualism 
here – there was no mind in the body, no ghost 
in the machine.  
This was the S-R psychology that Kelly 
(1969) rejected as useless. The clinical practice 
he devised is embedded in a pragmatic approach. 
He tells us that the work began as a clinical 
handbook, describing clinical strategies that had 
bee useful in Kansas. But the ‘hows’ of Volume 
2 (Kelly, 1955) were followed up with the 
‘whys’ of Volume 1 (Kelly, 1955). Here theory 
developed out of the practice, and PCT came 
into being. Kelly says he was surprised how far 
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practice and theory had strayed from orthodox 
psychology, and Volume 1 begins with ‘an invi-
tation to adventure’ without the customary cri-
tique of other approaches. Gone are all the land-
marks familiar to the psychologist: motivation, 
learning and reinforcement. There is no separa-
tion of behaviour, cognition and affect. Instead, 
the Fundamental Postulate talks of ‘psychologi-
cal processes’. When emotions are dealt with, 
there is no reduction to physiology. All this 
makes PCT strange, even incredible to psy-
chologists today. They see it as a criticism for 
example, that emotions are not described in 
physiological terms. And it highlights the second 
point I made earlier. The so-called integration of 
biological and psychological levels in contempo-
rary personality theory: it has no pragmatic 
value. Knowing that parts of the brain are acti-
vated in shyness, pleasure or aggression helps us 
not one jot. 
When Kelly proposed that a person’s proc-
esses are channelized by their constructions, he 
wasn’t denying that these same processes can 
also be understood physiologically. These are 
alternative systems of construction. This idea 
comes from William James’ pluralism. James 
held that the universe holds together, but loosely 
and provisionally. We have to come at things 
from different perspectives in order to see what 
works, what makes sense. An object has proper-
ties independent of the observer, but only some 
of them will appear in any particular relation-
ship. I may see a person as desirable, and this 
may dominate my perception of her. But this 
perception does not exhaust her attributes and 
from a different perspective, say that of an insur-
ance agent, desirability may not feature at all. 
Kelly’s claim was that we can make sense of 
quite a lot in terms of the way things appear to 
people, and this is one way in which the theory is 
phenomenological. Trying to appreciate the 
world-view of the person, the stories that they 
put together, is a useful way of making sense of 
their conduct. Now others might try to do the 
same job from an evolutionary or a physiological 
perspective. Fine. But you can’t mix these all up 
– they are different systems of construction. 
Many psychologists don’t seem to understand 
this. They think that throwing in some brain sci-
ence furnishes deeper (and sadly, more scien-
tific) explanations.  
Pragmatism holds that there are different vo-
cabularies for making sense of the same things – 
in this case, a person’s processes. When we say 
that seeing different colours is explained by ex-
posure to different wavelengths, we haven’t ex-
plained anything. This is just the way physicists 
talk about light. When we say that emotions are 
caused by brain states or hormones, this is just 
the biologists’ vocabulary for it. Actually, I’m 
not quite convinced by Kelly’s accounts of anxi-
ety, threat and guilt. I think existentialists like 
Farber (2000) have a better understanding of 
these emotions. But both Kelly and Farber pro-
vide us with proper psychological constructions. 
Anxiety is not caused by adrenaline and depres-
sion is not caused by a reduced level of 5HT in 
the synapses. These physiological changes may 
correlate with experience but they are not causal. 
If anything, in everyday life, the sequence of 
events will be reversed: the perception of an 
event as disturbing to my construction of myself 
may lead to all sorts of physiological churning. 
Dewey emphasised that we often confuse a se-
quence of events with causality.  
 
 
Understanding and explanation 
 
I think it useful here to distinguish between 
causal explanation and understanding (Butt, 
2004). This was a bipolar construct first under-
lined by Dilthey in the late nineteenth century 
(and incidentally, Mead studied briefly with 
Dilthey in Berlin). Dilthey argued that causal 
explanation is appropriate for the natural sci-
ences but not the human sciences – for example 
history and law. In causal explanation, we look 
for cause and effect relationships. So in physics, 
we can explain motion by identifying the forces 
acting on an object. A billiard ball moves as it 
does because of the force exerted on it by a cue, 
or another ball. Clearly, this is a very simple ex-
ample, but we can see how the principle applies 
in more complicated examples where interac-
tions combine to produce a particular effect. 
Several genes and environmental factors might 
together contribute to an individual’s bodily con-
stitution. Making sense of historical events is 
different though. We might say that World War 
2 was caused by Germany invading Poland, but 
here we are using the word ‘cause’ in a loose and 
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different sense. What we mean is that Britain and 
France’s declaration of war is understandable in 
terms of the German invasion. There is no sim-
ple determinism here. The allies might have de-
cided not to carry out their threat, and indeed 
Nazi Germany had gambled that they would 
back down, as they had over the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia. Causal explanations are deter-
ministic, and there is nothing deterministic in 
human affairs. 
Dilthey claimed that understanding is 
achieved not by looking for causal relations, but 
by putting events into a context. In this way we 
see them as part of a whole sequence of events. 
We note that the invasion of Poland was evi-
dence to Britain and France of Germany’s inten-
tion to expand beyond its borders, and beyond 
what it had already claimed as the greater Ger-
many. The significance of this must be under-
stood in terms of nineteenth and early twentieth 
century history; the issue of the balance of power 
in Europe. Understanding is based on the mean-
ing of events to participants, not on inevitable 
causal sequences. Literally, it involves ‘standing 
under’ what something means to people, trying 
to appreciate the way in which they make sense 
of things. There is no inevitability about this, 
because the same thing has different meanings to 
different people, and no one is impelled to act in 
a particular way in response. One can feel threat-
ened, but choose to retaliate, appease, ignore or 
re-interpret in the face of the threat. In trying to 
understand, we adopt different perspectives in 
order to contextualise an event. What is it part 
of? What does it mean? 
It is through looking at how something fits 
into a larger whole that we understand meaning. 
And everything may be seen in different and 
ever-expanding contexts of course. We can see 
this clearly in the communication that occurs in 
conversation. We talk of understanding what 
someone is saying to us, and of interpreting it. 
We do this by listening to the words, and inter-
preting meaning by seeing how they form part of 
a sentence. The sentence is the structure that 
gives a meaning to the word that we would miss 
if we just looked it up in a dictionary. So when 
someone says ‘Oh, I’m pleased to see you de-
cided to turn up’ we know that ‘turn up’ has 
nothing to do with their performing a summer-
sault. ‘Turn’ is in itself ambiguous, but there is 
nothing ambiguous about the way in which it is 
used here; the context clarifies the meaning. But 
the actual meaning of the sentence only becomes 
clear when we can place it in the context what 
else is happening, and the context of convention 
and social practice within which this is embed-
ded. So, if we are thirty minutes late for an ap-
pointment, we might conclude that what was 
said was not meant literally. Such an understand-
ing then requires an appreciation of what an ap-
pointment is, as well as a grasp of the uses of 
irony. So understanding involves a to-and-fro 
cycling between parts and whole to make sense 
of what is meant. Dilthey referred to this as the 
hermeneutic circle (hermeneutics being the name 
given to the art of interpretation). His claim was 
that the human sciences rest on this sort of 
method. Understanding people is more like in-
terpreting a text than predicting the movement of 
particles. PCT is a psychology of understanding. 
It makes sense of a person’s action by contextu-
alising it in terms of a person’s constructions. It 
looks for reasons, not causes. Cognitions don’t 
cause behaviour or emotion. Action (Dewey) / 
construing (Kelly) comprises all three.  
 
 
Understanding and phenomenology 
 
Just as pragmatism is now being thought about 
once again, so, too is understanding. The new 
interest in interview methods is phenomenologi-
cally based. It’s about investigating life-worlds, 
usually in the health field. What’s it like, to suf-
fer from irritable bowel syndrome, diabetes or 
cystic fibrosis? The aim here is not to explain 
anything causally, but to understand the pa-
tient’s, victim’s or client’s point of view. The 
flaw in a lot of this work is that it assumes that 
people can reach inside themselves and describe 
how they feel. PCT’s methods seem to me to 
offer some more interesting ways of helping 
people reach for expression. The beauty of ask-
ing people how two events are alike and so dif-
ferent from a third is that it exercises them. It 
gets them to think about concrete events that 
confront them. Exactly how is this person differ-
ent from that one? Why does he make me feel 
uncomfortable yet she doesn’t? What would 
have to change exactly in this situation for me to 
feel less anxious in it? Then the grid is such an 
Trevor W. Butt 
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excellent way of helping people think. What pat-
terns can the subject see? Does it throw any light 
on what exactly makes him or her anxious/feel 
depressed/uneasy etc. 
Of course many phenomenologists do not 
think that PCT is truly a phenomenological ap-
proach. But this need not worry us. Research like 
this is pragmatically based. What helps the pa-
tient, client or victim? 
 
 
CONSTRUCTIVISM 
 
In many ways, constructivism combines both 
pragmatism and phenomenology. And at its best, 
it is excellent stimulating stuff. But there is a 
long, long tail. Much of the work is disappoint-
ingly shallow, with no satisfactory literature re-
view or proper grounding in constructivist theory 
of any stripe. A tangential reference to Kelly 
1955 seems often to be the only credential on 
which many submissions are made to construc-
tivist journals. 
Perhaps the future for PCT does lie in the 
constructivist family. But we should think here 
of constructivism in its broad usage in the social 
sciences, not the rather restricted sense some-
times adopted by psychologists. Chiari and 
Nuzzo’s (1996) definition of constructivism is 
broad. It includes all those approaches that em-
phasise the relational approach both between the 
person and other people, and the person and her 
world in general. It moves our focus from what 
is going on ‘inside’ people, as it were, to what 
goes on between them. Phenomenologists refer 
to this as the intentional relationship between the 
person and her world. This is still seen as a radi-
cal approach in psychology. But it forms a 
bridge with the other social sciences. Interpretive 
and phenomenological approaches in sociology 
have re-invigorated a critical humanism building 
on narrative as a key concept. This approach is 
also based on the pragmatism of Mead and 
Dewey, and has the same aim: helping people to 
make sense of both their own lives and those of 
others. 
Lots of this work is based on narrative as a 
key metaphor – the person as story-teller. And 
this brings us to the Kellian model of the person 
as scientist. Kelly had been due to take part in 
symposium at Chicago University on motivation 
and emotion in September 1967. It was to be 
chaired by Theodore Mischel, and to bring to-
gether prominent psychologists and philoso-
phers. Sadly, Kelly’s death earlier in 1967 pre-
vented him from taking part. But the other par-
ticipants read each other’s work in advance of 
preparing their papers. Kelly’s was commented 
on favourably by British philosopher R. S. Peters 
(1969), who liked the ‘man the scientist’ meta-
phor because it credited the person with an 
agency denied them by behaviourism. But, he 
said, Kelly had not pursued his idea far enough. 
We can only think ‘scientifically’ because we 
are, in this day and age, all initiated into the rules 
of scientific thinking. The notion would have 
meant nothing to medieval people; it is only in-
telligible within a particular tradition. Sarbin 
(1986) makes a good case that person as author 
is a more basic metaphor. And stories are em-
bedded in traditions and transmit cultures. They 
are not merely individual productions. When I 
began this paper, I looked at psychology as a 
science and reviewed two stories that are told 
about it. Perhaps the person as narrator reflects a 
more basic human potential to story experience 
in order to make sense of it. The story is a good 
vehicle for understanding.  
Psychologists have adopted the language of 
the natural sciences, adopting a distance from 
their subject material. Causal explanation is an 
example of this, and is a restricted type of under-
standing that aims at prediction and control. This 
will do the job nicely, Rorty (1982) says, if we 
are trying to do something like evaluating artil-
lery fire. The aim of the natural sciences is pre-
diction and control. But the aim of the social sci-
ences is not. Their job is to develop a vocabulary 
for moral reflection and to help people get a bet-
ter grip on their lives, both collectively and indi-
vidually. Understanding has a crucial role to play 
in any civilised society. It now has a place in 
psychology. And PCT is ideally placed to help 
provide this.  
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Bell, R. C. (2003) The repertory grid technique. In F. 
Fransella (Ed.) International handbook of per-
sonal construct psychology. (pp. 95-103) Chiches-
ter: Wiley. 
Kelly’s legacy in personality theory 
 
59 
Personal Construct Theory & Practice, 5, 2008 
Butt, T. W. (2004) Understanding People. Basing-
stoke: Palgrave. 
Beck, A. (1976) Cognitive therapy and the emotional 
disorders Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Chiari, G., & Nuzzo, L.(1996) Psychological 
constructivisms. Journal of Constructivist 
Psychology, 9, 163 -184. 
Cromwell, R. (2007). Personal communication 
Ellis, A. (1962) Reason and emotion in psychother-
apy. New York: Lyle Stuart. 
Farber, L. (2000) The ways of the will. New York: 
Basic Books 
Kelly, G. A. (1955) The psychology of personal con-
structs. Two volumes. New York: Norton. 
Kelly, G. A. (1969) The autobiography of a theory. In 
B. Maher (Ed.), Clinical psychology and person-
ality: the selected papers of George Kelly. (pp. 
46-65) London: Wiley.  
Kelly, G. A. (1930/1979) Social inheritance. In P. 
Stringer & D. Bannister (Eds), Constructs of 
sociality and individuality. (pp. 4-17) London: 
Academic Press. 
Langdridge, D. & Butt, T. W. (2004) The fundamen-
tal attribution error: a phenomenological analysis. 
British Journal of Social Psychology, 43, 357-69 
Maher, B. (Ed.) (1969) Clinical psychology and per-
sonality: the selected papers of George Kelly. 
London: Wiley. 
Menand, L. (2002) The metaphysical club. London: 
Harper Collins 
Mischel, W. (1968) Personality and assessment. New 
York: Wiley 
Mischel, W., Schoda, Y. & Smith, R. (2004) Intro-
duction to personality: towards an integration. 
New York; Wiley. 
Pervin, L. & John, O. (2001) Personality: Theory and 
research. Chichester: Wiley 
Peters, R. S. (1969) Motivation, emotion, and the 
conceptual schemes of common sense. In T. 
Mischel (Ed.), Human action: Conceptual and 
empirical issues. (pp. 135-165). New York: Aca-
demic Press. 
Rorty, R. (1982) Consequences of pragmatism. New 
York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Sarbin, T. R. (1986) Narrative psychology: The sto-
ried nature of human conduct. New York: Praeger 
Walker, B. M., & Winter, D. A. (2007) The elabora-
tion of Personal Construct Psychology. Annual 
Review of Psychology 58, 453-477  
 
 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR 
 
Trevor Butt, PhD trained as a clinical psycholo-
gist before working at the University of Hud-
dersfield, where he is now Reader in Psycholo-
gy. He has published in the areas of personal 
construct theory, phenomenology, and psycho-
therapy, and is the joint author (with Vivien 
Burr) of Invitation to Personal Construct Psy-
chology and of George Kelly – The Psychology 
of Personal Constructs. 
Email: t.butt@hud.ac.uk. 
Home Page:  
http://www2.hud.ac.uk/hhs/staff/shumtb.php 
 
 
REFERENCE 
 
Butt, T. W. (2008). Kelly’s legacy in personality 
theory: Reasons to be cheerful. Personal Con-
struct Theory & Practice, 5, 12-20, 2008 
 
(Retrieved from http://www.pcp-
net.org/journal/pctp08/butt08.pdf) 
 
Received: 13 Jan 2008 – Accepted: 12 August 2008 – 
Published: 23 Dec 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
    
